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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Rosetta Stone criticizes Google for "cloak(ing] itself in decades of case law," (Dh.i. 147,
"RS Opp." at 2), but GOQgle believes that it is proper to ask this Court ID apply well-established

principles of trademark law in resolving the question presented for summary judgment: whether

on the present record Rosetta Stone can prove that Google has infringed.
Rosetta Stone argues thet Google's advertising program must infringe beca.use it involve:;

the "sale" of Rosetta Stone's trademarks and their use within ad text Under its theory. Rosetta
Stone need not prove anything else, i. e., it need not demonstrate that any given advertisement or
search results page is likely to confuse consumers. Rosetta Stone's infringement case against

Google focuses on Google's business model as a whole, and is premised on (he belief that
liability can be imposed without assessing any actual ads displayed by Google. Indeed, the only
actua l ads Rosetta Stone discusses anyv.,here are for altegedly counterfeit products. which
indisputably make up a tmy fraction of the total number of ads at issue in this case.
Google's position, on the other hand, is that infringement ccnnot be found absent a
finding that the ads actually displayed on Google.com are likely to confuse consumers as to the
source of the offered goods. And Google does not believe that Rosetta Stone can satisfy its
evidentiary burden on the issue of confusion and Google's alleged liability.

For example, Google believes that ads such as the ones displayed. below (from a search
resuits page captured April 12, 20 10) tnat appear in response to search

querie~

for "Rosetta

Stane'l clearly do not confuse consumers. Other search queries that include (but do not consist

solely of) Rosetta Stone's marks, such as "Rosetta Stone reviews," "Rosetta Stone at Amazon/'
or Ulanguage somvare like Rosetta Stone," generate search pages that are also unlikely to
confuse Google.com users.

Not only is there no

re~ord

evidence to the contrary, but any

1
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argument to the contrary is disingenuous.
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If, however, certain search results pages have L'1c.luded infringing ads, the question then
becomes under what factual circumstances can Google be held secondarily liabie fo r that third·
party content causing confusion, and whether Rosetta Stone is able to satisfy its evidentiary
burden of demonstrating that those factual circumstances exist on this record. In other words,

the ultimate issue before the Court is whether Google's advertising program as a whole can
infringe Rosetta Stone's marks (Rosetta Stone's position), or whether a more fact~specific
analysis is required (GoogIe' s position). Google respectfully submits that as a matter of law, the
record lacks evidence sufficient to support finding of trademark infringement against it.

RESPONSE TO DISPUTED FACTS

3 and I!.

The documents Rosetta Stone cites to support its assertion that Google's

2009 policy change was driven only by revenue actually show that Google was first concerned
about correcting overly generic and spammy-Iooking ads. See Spaziano Exs. I at GOOG-RS0251017,2 at GOOG-RS0251048-49. Exhibit 3 does not even mention trademarks at all.
4.

As explained in Google's Objections to Rosetta Stone's Statement of Undisputed

2
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Facts ("OSF"), ~ 4, there are many reasons users do not identify sponsored links as ads,

inciuding that they think ads are intrusive rind sponsored links are not.
5,8, and 11.

As explained in OSF ~ 11, there is no evidence that Google suggested that

any pCirticular advertiser bid on any particular trademarked keyword, or that it encouraged all
advertisers to bid on trademarked tenns. There is also no support for Rosetta Stone's assertion
that Google's Barn Owl tool is "fraught with inaccuT.ac.ies," Of that existence of a manual review

procedure reflects problems with the too1.
13.

Rosetta Stone is in the best position to identify counterfeiters. OSF 1112, 11. The

183 ads that Rosetta Stone complains of as for counterfeit goods represent O.Sgolo--less than one
percent---?fthe ads for which Rosetta Stone's seeks damages, See Declaration ofHcruy Lien in

Support of Google'sReply Memorandum ("Lien Reply Decl") ~ 3. This is not accurately
characterized. as "'regular,>!

14. and 16.

There is no evidence that the Google employees addressing counterfeiting

issues have responsibilities that are "far broader" than enforcing Google's trademark policies.
Nor is that relevant given Rosetta Stone's admission that the increase in counterfeiting is jn part
due to Rosetta Stone's increased brand awareness, not Goagle's trademark policy . .Further, only
three of the 2407 entries in two Rosetta Stone databases related to counterfeiting complaints
appear to reference Google.com as a possibJe website that was visited prior to purchasing
sofuvare. Lien Decl Ex. 27 at 263:18-264:12; Declaration of Thai Le in Support of GoogJe's
Reply Memorandum at ~ 3; Spaziano Ded. El(. 47; see also OSF
15 and 17.
19.

See OSF

~

~1f 9,

13, 14, 16.

14.

There is no evidence that Google did not take down ads Rosetta Stone identified

as selling counterfeit goods and using their marks. See OSF

V 14;

Spaziano Exs. 45-46,

3
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Declaration of Bill Lloyd in Support of GoogJe's Reply Memorandum ("Lloyd Reply Dec!.") ~'i[
4-&. The ads referenced in Exhibit 2& of the Spaziano declaration use the terms "Stone" or

URosertall which Rosetta Stone admits arc not its trademarks, and GoogJe omployees thus did not
take these ads down. Exhibits 30 and 3 J do not show unlawful uses, and Exhibit 29 does not

refer to a request to take down an ad at all.
1.

GOOGLE IS El'<'TITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGiI>1ENT THAT IT IS NOT
LIABLE FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGElY1ENT
A.

Google Cannot Be Held Liable For Referential Uses To Genuine Goods.

Rosetta Stone concedes that it has no monopoly in the words Rosena Stone, yet it seeks

to prevent Google from allowing third parties to use the words Rosetta Stone for any purpose in
CotUlcction with advertising on Google. RS Qpp. at 1-2, 14. This anti-competitive ambition runs
contrary to the central consumer protection goals and fundamental principles of trademark Ja\v.
Rosetta Stone argues that Google cannot invoke the first sale doctrine, or any other .\\'el1established rair use principle of trademark law, simply because of how Google advertising and

search services are designed, i.e., relevant advertisements are selected and displayed adjacent to
relevant organic search results based on what a ·user searc?es. even \vhen the search is for a
trademarked tenn.

Id.

It is unclear whether Rosetta Stone's position is that third-party

advertisers are not free to identify genuine Rosetta Stone goods as such-in defiance of a century
of trademark precedent-or that Google is not permitted to display otherwise legitimate

advertising according to an algorithmic detennination. But it does not matter. Both theories are

\V'tong and insufficient to defeat Google's motion.
Trademark law does not grant a monopoly against all uses of a mark, but only a narrow
set of uses thai are likely to cause confusion. E.g.. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc.,
962 F.2d 316,320 (4th CiI. 1992) (quoting: '''trademarks are designed to protectC<lnsumers from

4·
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being misled,' not to 'further or perpetuate product monopolies"') (citation omitted).

As

discussed in Google's other briefs, both referential and plain language uses of a trademark are
lawfuL

See Google Mem. Sec. ILA. and Il.C.2j; Google Opp. Sec. LB. Rosetta Stone's

authorized reseller.s can lawfully advertise that they sell Rosena Stone products; I Rosetta Stone's
affi liates can lawfully advertise discounts they offer; competitors can lawfully advertise
comparisons of lheir products to Rosetta Stone's (even in a way that Rosetta Stone docs not
like); informational sites can lawfuiIy refer to reviews of Rosetta Stone's produciS, and sites

having nothing to do with language learning can advertise products and services relating to the
actual Rosetta Stone artifact, stone and marble from foreign countries, and any other 2ds using
\

the plain language meaning of those words.

Id.

Rosetta Stone cannot use its status as a

trademark owner to prevent such lawful uses.!
Rosetta Stone could have chosen, of course, to not have authorized any reseUers or

affiliates, to differently mark the products available to them, or to contractually restrict their
advertising. Rosetta Stone cannot use trademark law to achieve what it did not through contract
law. See Sebastian Int'/, Inc.

Y.

Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1077,0.9 (9th eir.

1995) C'A trademark is misused if it serves to limit competition in the manufacture and sales of a
product" and "[b Jec.use [plaintiff] itself placed the collective mark all its products, it is primarily

responsible for any confusion that resulted from the mark's assertion of affi liation.").
I Rosetta Stone seems to argue that the first sale doctrine does not shield its authorized
reseHer Amazon.com because some unidentified (by name or number) consumers who purchased
software from Amazon.com were dissatisfied and tried to retum the software to Rosetta Stone.
A reseUer Ilotoffering a six-month. guarantee and Rosetta Stone not honoring one for all products
sold through authorized resellers is a contract issue, not a trademark one.

"E.g., S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Can g., 2d Sess. (1946) ("A trade-mark only gives tl,e right
to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect toe owner's good will against the sale of another's
product as his."); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669 (2007).

5
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Regarding the first sale doctrine, Rosetta Sione argues that the doctrine does not apply

because "Google offers the Rosetta Stene rviarks at auction

[0

any third party, whether or not a

reseHer of genuine Rosetta Stone product. These third parties bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks
and use the Marks in their Sponsored Link texL" RS Opp. at 15. This argument (i) wholly

ignores that resellers can la'.vIully make referential use of a mark; (ii) incorrectly assumes that

Google's policies allow anyone to bid or use a mark in a way that violates another'S intellectual
property rights, when in fact they don't; and (iii) misleadingly suggestS that "any third part,." can

use Rosetta Stone's marks in the text of an ad on Google.com, when in fact they cannot.
In other words, Rosetta Stone is simply 'wrong on the law and the facts. Sec Google

Mem. 8-12,20-21, Google Opp. at 14-18. Google's policies prohibit keyword use that would

result in trademark infringement, prohibit use of marks in ad text by anyone other than categories
of advertisers legally entitled to use the marks, such as reseUers.

non~competitor

review sites,

and repairers or sellers of compatible paris, and prohibit ads for counterfeit goods. Lloyd Dec!.
ElCS. 4-5,12; Caruso Dec!., Exs. 3-4. Whether intentionally or not, Rosetla Stone is arguing that
Google should be held liable for all ads, including tbe display of indisputably lawful ads. This is

contrary to the law. Without evidence regarding any specific ad that affirmatively implies a false
affiliation. Google is entitled to summary judgment for all ad for genuine goods.
B.

Google Cannot Be Held Liable For Functional Uses of Marks.

Google is also entitled to summary judgment on the use of Rosetta Stone's marks as
keY'vords because they are functional.
Rosetta Stone argues that the functionality doctrine applies only where a product feature
is a functional element of the mark holder's product, citing cases between competitors. where the
product feature was necessarily present in both parties' produ.cts. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v.

Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995); TrafflX Devices. Inc. v..I"lktg. Displays, Inc., 532
6
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U.S. 23. 26 (2001)' In those cases, the courts sought to prevent a mark holder from gaining a
monopoly over functional uses of a mark that "would put competitors at a significant non·

reputation-related disadvantage." Qua!itex. 514 U.S. at 1.65. Permitting a monopoly on such

functional uses would "inhibiiO legitimate· cornpetition~' in contravention to trademark law's
purpOSe of "promot[ing] competition by protecting a firm's reputation." Id at 164.
The same principles app ly here.

Google us<::s Rosetta Stone's marks in a purely

functional way-to identify relevant information to users searching on those words. ~ The fact
that ads on Google1 s website are paid for does not affect the functionality of Google's method of

ranking their relevance and does not eliminate the functionality of any words, including marks,
as keywords.

Just as Google uses search queries (which may be for trademarked terms or

generic ones such as ';:Ianguage learning software") to trigger organic search results relevant to a
user's search, it uses those same queries to trigger relevant ads. Rosetta Stone cannot draw!l

legally meaningfully distinction between the indexing function of its marks in organic search
results and Sponsored Links. Trademark law does not prohibit this functional use of words.

Unlike in Playboy Enterps., Inc. Y. Ner.rcape Com!"c 'ns Corp., where Netscape
displayed "competitors' unlabeled banner adv~rtisements. with no label or overt comparison to .
[plaintiff]. after Internet users type in [plaintifi's] trademarks," 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir.
2004). Google clearly labels the ads triggered by Rosetta Stone's marie; as "Sponsored Links,"
identifies linked sites by including the visible URL in the ad, and many competitors' ads put a
reference to Rosetta Stone in context
.
4
Courts have recognized the important informatiQn~providing role search engines like
Google provide to the public. As one court explained, "it would seem more remarkable still. and
a pity. if the law, in its over-elCuberant giddiness as it thrashes about with mark-type conflicts in
cyberspace, should kill such a resource (i.e., readily available Internet directories and search
engines]." Designer Skin, LLe v. S & L Vitami".s. Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811. 819 n.7 (D. Ariz.
2008) (citation omitted); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. Y. Welles, 279 FJd 796, 803-04 (9th Cit.
2002) ("Searchers would have a much more difficult time locating relevant websites if they
could do so only by correctly guessing the long phrases necessary to substitute for trademarks.");
Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory L. J. 507 (2005).

7
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C.

There Is Insufficient Evidence OfCoEfusion To Defeat Googie's Motion.

Without procf of likelihood of confusion. Rosetta Stone cannot prevail on

i~'s

infringement claims. liThe likelihood of confusion is the lynchpin of infringement." E.g. ,
Cosmetic Dermatology & Vein Centers oj Downrive}'~ Poe. v. New Faces Skin Care Centers,
Ltd.. 9i F.Supp.2d 1045, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 2000). There is no such ev idence here.

1.

Confusion Cannot Be Presumed.

Rosetta Stone argues dlat «confusion is presumed in cases, such. as this one, involving

counterfeit marks." RS Opp. at 9. While Rosetta. Stone's desire to presume away irs burden of

!'

proof is not surprising considering the utter lack of confusion evidence in this record, no

authority supports doing so here. The presumption cases Rosetta Stone cites addresses only the
actual counterfeiters' or competitors' use of the plaintiffs mark on their products. None
presumed confus ion caused by the publisher of an advertisement

Where, as here, the

overwhelming majority of the ads at issue are for genuine goods, confusion cannot be presumed.

See Shak"peare Co. v. SiIstar Corp.

0/ Am.,

110 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (presumption

inappropriate where mark described "a functional aspect of the producf'); Anheuser-Busch, 962
F.2d at 321-22 (presumption inappropriate where mark was used for tile purpose of parody).

2.

,.,

Rosetta Stone's "Evidence" Of Confusion Is Illusory.

Ads For Gelluine Goods Are Nat COli/using.

There is also no evidence in the record showing that any of the millions of ads that used
Rosetta Stone's marks to advertise genuine Rosetta Stone products was confusing. Lacking such
evidence. as part of its generalized attack on Google's business model. Rosetta Stone points to

two studies: Ca) experiments Gaagle conducted in 2004 concerning any use of a trademark in ad
text, and (b) a survey conducted by Dr. Van Liere.

RS Opp. at 9-13.

Neither provides

meaningful evidence of confusion as to the source of goods offered or the ads themselVes.

8
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As a preliminary matter, both studies arc capable of showing nothing more than the first

step of initial intere:;t confusion-i.e.. what a user thinks aboul'an ad that may lead to clicking on
the ad. See, e.g., RS Van Lier. Opp. at 19 ("Dr. Van Liere's survey was properly designed to
test <initial interest confusion' caused by Google's Spoi'lsored Links."); Brewer Decl., Ex. 1;

Spaziano Decl.~ Exs. 13-15. Neither prcJ:vides any evidence that a user encDuntering even the
specific ads tested wou ld actually click: on

tho~e

ads erroneously believing them to be Rosetta

Stone's website. Indeed. Dr. Van Liere's survey showed that respondents shown the Sponsored

Links were less confused about which links were offici al company websites than were those who
saw only organic listings.' See Blair Decl., Ex. A, at 5·6. Google's 2004 study did not involve

any ads using the Rosetta Stone marks at QU. Thus. neither provides evidence that initial interest
confusion actually occurred. See, e.g., Vail Assocs., inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co .. Ltd., 516 F.3 d 853,
872 (lOth Cir. 2008) ("[A] court caonot simply assume a likelihood of initial interest oonfusion,

even if it suspects it The proponent of such a theory must prove Ie').
Whether Dr not Rosetta Stone can prove initial interest confusion is irrelevant. however,
because this Circuit does not recognize initial interest confusion as a basis for imposing
trademark liability in the internet context. Lamparello v. Fa/well, 420 FJd 309, 315-16 (4th Cir.

S As discussed in Google's briefing on its motion to exclude Dr. Van Liere, his survey is
deeply flawed in a number of ways. including his misguided approach to testing and measuring
"endorsement." Smith v. Waf-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
("Even with regard to the tested concepts, the Court finds that the sl4cvey was so flawed that it
does not create a genuine issue of material fact"). Among other errors, Dr. Van Liere counted as
confused respondents who identified as "endorsed by Rosetta Stone" ads by Amazon.com and
Coupon Cactus, which, ilJdisputably~ were an authorized reseller and premium affiliate
(respectively) of Rosetta Stone at the time the tested ads actu;;lly ran. Caruso Decl., Exs. 19,4243,66 at 166:14-24, 176:2-14; Blair Dec1. ~~ 15-19, Ex. A at 9. [fDr. Van.Liere'ssurvey results
were otherwise left intact and these two categories of respondents were properly classified as not
confused, the "net confusion" of the survey would be -3%-i.e., fewer people who saw the
Sponsored Links were "confused" than those who did not. BI,';r Decl. 1 18.
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2005). As the Fourth Circuit explained: "[Wle have r.eycr adopted the initial interest confusion

theory; rather. we

h~ve

followed a verI different mode of analysis, requiring courtS to detennine

whether a likelihood of confusion exists by examining the allegedly infringing lise in (he context
in \lihich it is seen by th.e ordinQ;Y consumer." Lampar{!.J/o, 420 F.3d at 316 (internal quotation
omitted, emphasis in original).

Such analysis requires looking not only to the allegedly

infringing use giving rise to the purported initial interest confu5ion, such as a domain name or ad,
"but also to the underlying [content] of the website."

Id. at 318; see also Carl v.

b"rnQrdjcarl.com, 662 F.Supp. 2d 487, 496 (E.D. Va. 2009) (rejecting the initial interest
confusion theory as not accepied by the Fourth Circuit). Even jf initial IDter!::st confusion were

cognizable in this Circuit and on these facts (neither of which is true), such would not be an
actionable theory of direct liability against Google becal.,lSe Google "does not compete with the

markholder for sales." Lamparel/o, 420 F.3d at J 17; see also id. at 317 n.6 (noting adverse First
Amendment consequences to unwarranted expansion of initia l interest confusion).

ii

Rosetta Stone's "Evidence" Concerlling Ads For Allegedly
Counterfeit Goods Is Insufficient to Defeat Google's .Motioll.

Lacking any confusion evidence concerning ads for genuine goods, Roset'";4 Stone 1atches

on to the fact that some ads on Google.com were allegedly for counterfeit goods ",ith the hope
! •

that the existence of those ads will lead the Court to shut down all advertising usin g Rnsetta
Stone's marks, however legitimate. The gulf betvleen the number of ads Rosetta Stone alleges to

be counterfeit and the scope of the liability it seeks to impose is stunning. In its Opposition,

Rosett.a Stone identifies 182 ads that it contends were for counterfeit goods. RS Opp. at 20,
referencing Calhoun DecL Ex. C. These represent O.S9%--less than one percent--of the ads
that Rosetta Slone seeks damages for. Lien Decl. ~ 3 lfRosetta Stone could prove each of these
ads offered counterfeit products and resulted in actionable confusion, that would still be

10
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insufficient to hold Google directly liable. Indeed, in Tiffany (:oIJ) Inc. v. • Bay Iroc., where the
plaintiff asserted that up to 75% of the listings using its trademark were for counterfeit products:

the Second Circuit a.ffirmed that such listings were wholly irrelevant to the question of eBay's
direct infringement. No. 08-3947-cv, 2010 WL [236315, '2, '7 (2d Cir. Apr. 1,2010).
Even if otherwise relevant, Rosetta Stone's "evidence" falls short of establishing
confusion. First, Rosetta Stone must prove that each ad it contends offered counterfeIT goods
actua lly did so-as opposed to, for example, genuine products acquired througb individual retail
sale. surp lus acquisition, or international purcba.o;Co.c Giving Rosetta. Stone the benefit of every
possible inference in its favor, the most Rosetta Stone can possibly prove is that five indiyiduals
purchased actual counterfeit products after visiting Google.com. See RS Opp. at 10-11, n.S.
This is de minimus as a matter of law. George & Co .. LLC v. imagination Enlrn 't Ltd., 575 FJd

383, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2009) (affinning that four instances of actual confusion among 500,000
units sold was de minimis evidence of confusion).
Rosetta Stone tries to hide the de minirnus nattire of its evidence with self-serving

declarations and interrogatory responses and the testimony of Google lawyers concerning screen
shots presented at their depositions. RS Opp. at 11-12; see Spaziano Opp. Decl. Ex. 38, Calhoun
DeGI. This effort is unavailing. The documents referenced in Mr. Calhoun's Declaration reveal
that!!.!!!!!!. of those records of complaints identified Google as the means by which the allegedly
counterfeit prodncts were located. Le Decl. at

1~3-4.

In

COntras~

the records identify other

soutces such Craigslist and spam email, which cannot be tied to Google's Sponsored Links. [d.
,
E.g. , Microsoft v. MBC Enters., 120 Fed. Appx. 234, 237-38 (lOth Cir. 2004)
(reversing summary judgment premised on erroneous finding of counterfeits) (unpublished);
Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distrib., LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 682 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (denying
summary judgment to plaintiff that failed to provide sufficient evidence that products at issue
were counterfeit).
.
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Thus, Rosetta Stone's remaining :'evidence" amounts to mere speculation. and conjecture) \vhich
is insufficient to defeat Google's motion.
Rosetta Stone's efforts to manufacture evidence of confusion through depositions of
Google's lawyers is likewise inadequate. Without any foundation that Ms. Chen or Ms. Hagan
were among "those purchasers most likely to partake of the alleged infringer's goods or
services," they cannot be counted as confused. AmSlar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, inc., 615 F.2d
252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980). Also, when Rusetta Stone's counsel asked them to identify which
Sponsored Links on a printed screen shot offered Rosetta Stone's products for sale, both

.I";
i. j

:.

responded that they could not tell for certain without more information, and then . identified
which ads claimed

[0

offer Rosetta Stone products. See Google Opp. OSF 18. Being uncertain

about the source of a product referenced in an ad does not evidence confus ion; it reflects
a.wareness that more infonnatian is nece.ssary_ E.g. , Nora Beverages. Inc. v. Perrier Group of

Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[nquiries about the relationship between an owner

I.,

of a mark and an alleged infringer do not amount to actual confusion. Indeed. such inquiries are

,.

arguably premised upon a lack of confusion between Lie products sucb. as to inspire the inquiry

I

L

itself"). Thus, even this additional so-called confus ion evidence cannot defeat Google's motion.
3.

Relevant Likelihood of Confusion Factors Disprove Confusion.

As discussed above, use of Rosetta Stone' s marks in connection

goods is lawful to refer

(0

with the sale of genuine

Rosetta Stone. Traditional likelihood-of-confusion factors are not

designed to address such uses because they do not involve passing off. E.g., Century 21 Real

Estate Corp. v. LendingTree. inc., 425 F.3d 211,224-25 (3d Cir. 2005).

i
(

However, if the Court deems it appropriate to consider factors other than Ros~tta Stone's

-

lack of evidence of actual confusion, which both parties agree is the most important
consideration (sa RS Mem. at 20), Google respeclfully submits that two other factors may bear
12
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on the likelihood of confusion anaiysis hero: Google's intent and the sophistication of the

relevant market. Both favor Google and support 5ummary judgment in its favor.
There is no dispute about the facts relating to Google's intent-just how the law should

apply to them. As tho record makes clear, Google' s policies have always prohibited ads for
counterfeir goods; Google has always prohibited ads that violate the intellectual property rights
of others; Gaagle has alway, re'panded to Rosetta Stone's complaints of uses of its marks that

were not in compliance with Google's policies; Google has assisted Rosetta Stone in its efforts to
track down foreign and domestic criminals; and Google is motivated

tD

h3ve users pleased with

the ads displayed on Google.com and therefore works to make those ads a positive experience-

which ads for counterfeit products undennine.

Google Opp. OSF 9.

Further, Google's

trademark policies have always been comfortably within the bounds permitted by law, as
confIrmed by briefing in this action-and 'by Rosetta Stone's efforts to lobby for legislative

changes to prohibit the presently lawful use of trademark terms as keywords. Caruso Decl., Ex.
77 at 195:3-196:1; Ex. 51 at 218:15-219:25; Exs. 36-39 . .
Rosetta Stone responds to these facts with one sentence in a footnote thal "Google

knowingly and willfully used

th~

Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner that would drive internet

traffic away from Rosetta Stone and to the sites of its other customers." RS Opp. at 13 n.7. The

actual evidence Rosetta Stone relies on. however. tcHs a different story. It reflects that Google
was aware that competition for trademark tenns could increase cost per click rates for trademark
owners, but does not contain any hiilt of knowledge-much less intent-that traffic would be

diverted from the site of any trademark owner. Spaziana Exs. 38-40. Rosetta Stone ca!Uw! use

unfounded and indirect inferences of intent to defeat Google's summary judgment motion, See,
e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, . 255 (1986) (requiring only "justjfiable

13
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inferences" be drawn in the non-movanCs favor).
In its Opposition: Rosetta Stone does not contest that "sophistication and expertise of the

usual purchasers can preclude any likelihood of confusion among them stemming from the
similarity of trade names."

Perini Corp. v. Perini CDl)Str. Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir.

1990). Nor does it attempt to distinguish the cases Google cited in it opening brief (Goog. Mem.
at 18) for the proposition that COJ15umers making purchases in the $20 range were sophisticated.

Instead, Rosetta Stone asserts. without any support whatsoever, that "the relevant market is 'the
public at large.'"

RS Opp. at 13 n.7. That is contradicted by the undisputed record. Rosetta

Stone software retails for approximately $229 for a single level and $509 for a three level
bundle.

Google Opp. GSF 19.

Consumers carefully deliberate before purchesing foreign

language software, and Rosetta Stone's custoiners have higher income and
than tbe "public at Jarge." ld In
posit~

addition~

even to encounter

th~

educ~tiDnal

levels

situation that Rosetta Stone

is confusing (Le. a search results page for a query containing a Rosetta Stone mark), a user

must have unaided recall ofthe Rosetta Stone mark. Caruso Deel., Exs. 34-35,60 at 119:5-20,
69 at 86:20-88: l. In other words, Rosetta Stone's claim that the relevant market is "the public at
large" is factually and legally implausible on this record and th is factor strongly favors Google.
II.

ROSETTA STONE OFFERS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR HOLDING GO OGLE
SECONDARlLY LIABLE FOR TRADElvlARKINFRINGEMENT.
Secondary liabilit-j ' for trademark infringement is reserved for those who take a very

active role in the infringing
infringement.

Simply

pu~

conduc~,

i.e., knowing and intentional assistance of the direct

to impose secondary liability for trademark infringement, the

defendant must be in cahoots with the infri.'1ger. The record offers no such evidence here.
A-

Google Does Not Ind uce Infringement Of Rosetta Stone's Marks.

Rosetta Stone cannot prove that Google intended for a third party to infringe Rosetta

14
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Stone's marks. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. lves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 860 (!982) (White, 1.,

concurring). In opposition to Google's motion. Rosetta Stone does not cite a single piece of

evidence demonstrating inducement; it simply asserts that "GoQgle intentionally induces
customers to bid on trademark tenns as ke)'\\'ord triggers' and to use trademark tenns in the text
and title of Sponsored Links." RS Opp. at 19. Even if true, this faUs far short of proof that

Google intended for anyone to infringe Rosetta Stone's marks. Rosetta Stone cites no authority.

and we are aware of none, that holds a company vica.riously liable for trademark infringement as
a result of providing neutral tools, such as those containing information reflecling actual

advertiser and user behavior on Google. In contrast. the defendant in Bauer Lamp Co., Inc.,

\I.

Shaffer) did not merely uask" a lamp manufacturer to manufacture the infringing lamps , he did so
as part of a personal vendetta to "even the score"-with the plainiiff. with the goal of selling an
identical lamp at a lower price and putting him out of business. 941 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 ( 111J:t
Cir. 1991).

Indisputably, there are no such facts here.

A..,d Transdermal Prods. Inc. v.

Paiformance Contract Packaging, Inc. was essentially a ruling on the sufficiency of the
pleadings determining that a third party that "could be liBble" on a theory of contributory
infringement could be joined under Rule 14. 943 F. Supp. 551, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

B.

Google Does Not Supply Its Product To Anyone It Knows To Infringe.

After Google filed.its opening brief, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Tiffany (NJ)

Inc. v.•Bay, Inc., which affmned a case relied on by Google for the proposition th.t whcn an

alleged secondary infri.nger has taken "appropriate steps to cut off the supply of its product or

services to the infringer," courts should decline to impose contributory liability_Tiffany Inc. v.
eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463,516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), afJ'dNo. 08-3947-cv, 2010 WL 1236315,
*7 (2d Cir. Apr. I, 2010). Incredibly, Rosetta Stone argues that the Second Circuit's opinion
somehow supports its position, RS Opp: at 20, despite cBay not being held liable for the sale of

IS
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counterfeit Tiffany products· on eBay.ccm of which it was not specifically aware.

Rosetta

Stone's erroneous reliance en Tiffany here ignores the extent of eBay involvement in the

cou~terfeit listings at issue 1 and the pervasiveness of those listings. both of which were orders of
magnitude greater than present in the instant action. Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315, at *2.
Rosetta Stone's ipse dixit assertion that Google had better reason to know the identity of
counterfeiters than eBay did, RS Opp. at <,0, is wholly unsupported. It is unreasonable to expect
that Google check WHOIS for every one of the millions of Ad\Vords accoW1ts created per year.

for each domain displayed in each individual ad created by those millions of advertisers, and
Google does not. Lloyd Decl. .~ ~ 10. Nor does it have any legal obligation to. As such, Rosetta
Stone's examples of three ads, each with separate and distinet URLs (RS Opp. at 21 -22), and

each with different advertiser con tact information, are insufficient to prove that Google should
have known that any single advertiser of alle&edly counterfeit products whose ads were
displayed was the same advertiser responsible for other ads.

C.

Google Does Not Vicariously Infringe.Rosetta Stone's lVlarks.

To prevail on a claim of vicarious trademark infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that
Google and the direct infringers ,uhave an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind
one anotber in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the
infringing product." Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'/ Servo Assoc., 494 FJd 788, 807 (9th Cir.

.

-~

Briefi ng in that action reflects that eBay (l) made its most effective keywords
available to sellers during conference calls and specifically identified 'Tiffany" as one of the top
searcbec\ keywords, (2) identified "Tiffany" as a "hof' keyword in the Jewelry and Watches
category, (3) identified "Tiffany" in its "Holiday Hot Lisf' provided to sellers, (4) encouraged
sellers to view its Pulse webpage that includes the top searches and most watched items, both of
which included "Tiffany" and "Tiffany & Co." at vario us times, and (5) reimbursed affiliates for
sponsored links that advertised the sale of Tiffany jewelt)' on eBay. Lien Decl. Ex I, Plaintiff's
Post Tria! Memorandum, D/Q 74 at 6-l0. Further, Tiffany submitted m OTe than 284,000 notices
of claimed infringement to eBay concerning counterfeits. Jd. at 14-.
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2007) (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensil1g Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 , 1150
(7th Cir. 1992)). The record contains no facts showing that Google has the requisite level of
partnership, joint ownership, or joint control over any alleged infringing ads.

The few eoure to address vicarious tradema.rk infringement have interpreted the test qUlte
rigorously. In the seminal Hard Rock decision, the Seventh Circuit grounded the concept of
vicarious trademark liability in •.joint-tortfeasor theory. 955 F.2d at 1150. Relying on the Hard

Rock test, other courts have concluded that "the essence of joint tortfeasor liability is fault-joint
tortfeasors are all persons who act in concert (0 commit a tort, pw·suant io

Q

common purpose. ".

AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F. 3d 1421, 1441 n.22 (3d. Cir. 1994)

(emphasis added) (ciling McCarthy on Trademarks 25.03[1) al 25-35); see a/so Fare Deals.
LTD., v. WorldChoic, Travel.com,·jnc., 180 F. Supp ..2d 678, 684-85 (D. Md. 2001) (examining

vicarious liability in the context of agency law and principlesj. Notwithstanding the GEICO
court's determination that a vicarious claim should not be dismissed on the pleadings, absolutely
no precedent supports applying this rare ly invoked theory to Google"s actions here, where there

is no evidence of Google acting in concert with anyone to infringe Rosetta Stone's rnarks s.
III.

GOOGLE QUALIFIES FOR THE rNNOCENT PUBLISHER DEFENSE
Recognizing the inevitable chilling effect of holding liable for d.mages publishers, with

no wrongful knowledge or inrent, for their publication of an infringing or false ad created by

a~other, Congress provided a limitation on damages in such instances. 15 U.S.C. 1114(2)(B).'

S As Rosetta Stone admits, its state common law trademark and unfair competition claims
ri,e and fall with its Lanham Act claims. RS Opp at 24 n.13. Accordingly, Google is entitled to
summary judgment on those too.

, u[T)rademark lows ... often raise difficult questions about freedom of speech" and the
revisions in the innocent publisher defense asetO forth critical const~tutional protections" by
(footnote continued)
17
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This limitation applies here, where as discussed in Sections I.C'} and II.B, Google does not

kno\...·ingly peQIlit ads for counterfeit goods and indisputably takes down those it is notified of.
Caruso DecL Ex. 21; Ex. 23-25; Ex. 28; Ex. 65, 135: 11-138:25; Ex. 72; Calhoun Decl., Ex. C.

.,. ",

Rosetta Stone argues that Google cannot

quali~

for this limitation because of various

steps it [Qok to encourage advertising. RS Opp. at 28. This is incorrect. Under this logic, if any
publisher promoted the availability of advertising opportunities for its publication. it would lose
the statutory protection.

Imposin~

lia.bility for damages without any specific knowledge or

encouragement of unlawful ads would defeat the very purpose of the statute. Here, no evidence
I: -~'

of such knowledge or encouragement exists. Iv Google Opp. aSF 9.

IV.

ROSETTA STONE'S DILUTION CLAIlVI FAlLS
Rosetta Stone concedes that Google -does nOl use Rosetta Stone's marks to identify

Google's own goods and services. RS Opp. at 25. As such, Google cannot be held liable for
dilution. See Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315 at *15 (holding that "insofar as eBay did not itself sell

the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution").

, ,

Even if Google could theoretically be held liable for dilution, it cannot on this record.
Rosetta Stone's assertion that its marks were famous in 2004 (RS Opp. at 25) is entirely

contradicted by its own records showing i{ had brand a\\'areness of less than 16% in 2005, a year
...:<

"ex:empt[ing1 from liability 'innocent' disseminators of offending material."

Remarks of

Subcommittee Chaiman Robert Kastenmeier, 134 CongoRec. HI 0420 (Oct. 19, 1988).

, .;

10 Further, the relevant facts here are identical to Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., where the
court denied injunctive relief "because cBay has stopped running all the advertisements claimed
to be infringing and it has no intention of rUi1l1ing th2 identifie.d advertisements in the future."
165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2001)(emphasi>added)_ Google bas done the same.

18
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after the allegedly dilutive behavior began. Caruso DecL Ex~. 3Ip33. 11 That is clearly not what
the Anti-Dilution Act contemplates. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) ("{A] mark is famous if it is

widely recognized by the general consuming public . . .. "); McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, §24:106 (suggesting that for a mark to ·be famous it must have at least 75%

:lwareness in a sur/ey of the general consuming public). Nor has Rosetta Stone proven, or even
offered a plausible L1COry of how, Google's actions are likely to harm its trademark. See 15
U.S.C. §il25(c](l ) (usc of a mark must be "likely to
tarni~hment).

cau~e

dilution by blurring or dilution by

Indeed. the record is to the contrary. Rosetta Stone's brand equity has improved

since 2004, and even [he five individuals who allegedly purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone
products continue

10

have a positive impression of Rosetta Stone. Spaziano Dec!., Tab A. at

Dubow 45:1-46:2, Jeffries 40: 11-41:20, Doyle 25:10-22, Porter 41:14-24, Thomas 29:19-30:17.

v.

ROSETIA STONE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS
The parties agn:e that to prevail on en unjust enrichment claim, Rosetta Stone must prove

that (I) it conferred a benefit on Google; (2) Google Imew of the benefit ar.d should have
reasonably expected to repay Rosetta Stone for it; and (3) Google sceepted or retained the
benefit without paying for its val ue. RS Opp. at 26. It cannot.

First, Google has not "taken" any benefit from Rosetta Stone. A trademark owner has no
property right<i in its mark beyond the right to prevent conSUmer confusion as to source of its
goods. See. e.g.. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (nA trade-mark only gives the

right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of
another's product as his."). U!lless Google's actions violate Rosetta Stone's trademark rights,
II
Nor does Rosetta Stone's theory that nGoogle uses the Rosetta Stone.Mark because
they are famous" salvage its dilution. Any word can be bid on as a keyword; if Rosetta Stono
were correct that mere use of a word as a keY'\'ord proved fame. all marks ~ould be "famous."

19
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Rosetta Stone has no proof that Google took any benefit that rightfully belonged to Rosetta

Stone. Rosetta Stone cites no contrary cases. 12
Second, Rosetta Stone concedes

[ha~

there is no evidence that Google promised to pay

anything for the use of Rosetta Stone's marks; ins tea.d. it contends that the promise can be
implied. RS Opp. at 27. Roset'", Stone cites no cases with comparable facts in support of this

assertion,l) which is contrary to the general rule that U[o]ne may not recover under a theory of
implied contract simply by showing a benefit to lhe defendant, without adducing other facts to

raise an implication that the defendant promised

[0

pay the plaintiff for such benefit" New-ich

\I.

r -'

I .

li

JOl1es, 245 Va. 465, 476 (1993). Accordingly, Google is entitled to summary judgmenl
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and upon all papers submitted in connection with the Google's
briefing of the parties' summary judgment motions, Google respectfully requests that its Motion
For Summary Judgment be granted.
Ro-spectfully Submitted,
GOOGLEINC.
By counsel

lsi
Ionathan D. Frieden, Esquire (VSB No. 41 4 52)
Stephen A. Cobb, Esquire (VSB No. 75876)
ODIN, FELDMAN & PIITLEMAN, P_C.
9302 Lee Highway, Suite 1100
.Fairfax, Virginia 22031
(703) 218-2100
12

Having conceded that its contract with Google "delineated w~t Rosetta agreed to pay

Google," Rosetta Stone has apparently abandoned the allegations of its unjust eruichment claim
that "[tJhrough the auction of Rosetta Stone's trademarks Google unjustly derived a benefit from
Rosetta Stone in the fonn of higher payments from Rosetta Stone." First Amended Comp.1123.
" Unlike in the cases cited by Rosetta Stone, Google did not benefit from any utilities or
professional services rendered by Rosetta Stone of the ty;oe for which there is usually a fee

arrangement or compensation, nor did jt publish a work·ofRosetta Stone's without permission.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTER."N DISTRICT OF VIRGIN!A
(Alexandria Divisi~n)

ROSETTA STONE LTD.
Plaintiff,

,
;. CIVIL ACTION NO. I :09cv736

v.

: (GBLITCB)

,

GOOGLE INC.
Defendant.

.t:.-!-

DECLARATION OF BILL LLOYD

~ William ("Bill") Lloyd, ·hereby declare:
L

l oam currently employed as Team Le.ad-L~gal Advertising Support by Google

Inc. ("Go ogle"}. I make this declaration in support of Google's Reply Memorandum in Support
i·

of its Motion for Summary Judgment in the matter caption<?ri Rosetta Stone Ltd.
Civil Action No.1 :09-cy-736 (E.D. Va.). I am over the age of eighteen. I know

\I

Google. Inc.,

~"e

facts stated

herein of my own personal knowledge alldlor my re\~ew o"f b~tness recards. If called to testify
as a witness: "I could and would do so competently end under oath.
l

;

2.

,..,

As part of my duties as Team Lead. I am familiar with, and assist in the·

enforcement of. Google's trademark and co~terfeit policies.
3.

I have been asked to review the actions taken by Google m response to several

complaints it received from Rosetta Stone.
4.

By consulting the trademark complaint database where Google stores information

regarding trademark complaints. as well as corresponding conununications and our internal
policy enforcement lool, I deternlined lhat Google received a complaint from Rosetta Stone on

February 2, 2010, regarding an advertisement displaying the website address

•.. ;
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cheaprosettostoneonsaie.com. Google processed this complaint on February 3, 2010, and the

advertisement was subsequently removed.
5.

I also consulted the trademark complaint da!abasc where Google.siores

information regarding trademark complaints and.determined that Google receive~ a complaint

.•

from Rosetta Stone on February 2,2010 regarding an aovertisemeni displaying the website

address rosettastonemaUs.com. Googie processed this complaint on February-3, 2010 and the
advertisement.was removed. :

Ii.

An email with the bates number RS-Oll·002420 reflects that Google received a

complaint from Rosetta Stone on September 24, 2009 regarding an advertisement displaying the
website address dvdmallonline.com. · This email ",as sent through the Risk Team and not·through

the official trademark or counterfeit complaint process. Therefore the co~plaint was not logged

into Goagle's trademark complaint database. However, according to GoogLe's reCords. that
·advertisement did not run after the date that Google received the complaint (i.e., September 24,
2009).
7.

A document bates numbered RS·O 11-008031 refieots that Rosetta Stone's

complaints about the advertisemeuI.s rlisplaying the webSite addrc.'Sses
gamsoftmall.oomirosettastoneColorado, and gainsofhnali.com/rosettastone, aUegedly seiling
counterfeit goods, WeTe sent t~ Google throUgh the Risk Team and not through the official
trade~ark

or counterfeit complaint process. The accounts and ads in question -were s~speaded;

however) the URLs were not automatically flagged, or logged into Google's trademark
complaint database because Rosetta Stone did not use the right q>mplaint process. If Google had
. received Rosetta Stone's complaint through the fonnal process, Google would have flagged and
prohibited the URL indefinitely.
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8.

I also looked at the our internal policy enforcement taol regarding the

advertisements displaying the websi te ?ddresses hotmallstore.com, hotmartforyou.com, ana
hotma1l2u.com. Google's precessing ofa complaint for one ofthese URLs did not prevent
display of ads with links to the others because they had qifferent URLs. Once \. . e r~ct:!ved

,.

complaints related to the other two URLs, they were also flagged so that further ads for them

i

could not be shown.
9.

As part of the trademark team's investigation oftrade:mark and counte-rfeit

complaints, it does not routinely check the WHOIS registration of URLs.
10.

Queries ofGoogJe's records reve;)l that in the past year, millions of AclWGids

accounts have been created. There have been trillions of ad impressions displayed On
Google.com since 2004.

r declare Wlder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executoo on
Aprii 14,2010 at Mountain View, California.
i..:
j : •

... ;

Bill Lloyd

i· :

L:

i ,.
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IN THE UNITED STATES mSTRlCT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
(Ale"ndria Division)
ROSETTA STONE LTD.
Plaintiff,

,
: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09cv736 (G8L1
: TCB)

v.

GOOGLE INC.
Defendant

DECLARATION OF THAI LE IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE INC.'S REPLY IN
FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGNlENT

.,

I, Thai Le, declare as follows :

1.

I am over eighteen (18) years of age.

r am an ilssociate at the law firm

Quin" Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel of record for Defendant Goagle, Inc.

("Googie"), in this action. I make this declaration in suppOrt of Googlels Reply [n
Further Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. I have personal knowledge of , he

facts stated herein as set forth below and if called to testify: could and would competently
testify thereto.
2.

On April 9, 2010, [submitted a declaration in support afGoogle's

Opposition to Rosetta Stone's Motion for Partial SummE.ry Judgment. In that declaration,
I describe my review of voluminous records produced. by Rosetta Stone in this litigation
as a collection of documents bates labeled RS·OI4 ·009601 (the Pararurc data ), and
documents bates labeled RS-OI4-000038 to RS· OI4-009600 (the Quickbase data), which

records are referenced by the Declaration of Jason Calhoun in Support of Rosetta Stone's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability filed March 26, 2010.

3:

I reviewed all of the provided Parature and Quickbase data, and note the

following:

6598

3_

None of the Parature data references Google as a website that was

visited as pat1 of the purchase of an allegedly counterfeit product or mentions

UGoogie," "search," or "sponsored link."
b.

None of the 2)46 Quickbase din. records references the use of

Google's Sponsored Links to purchase a product.
c.

Only three of the total 0[ 2407 entries in the Parature and

Quickbase data combined appear to contain any reference to Gaogle.com as a
website that was visited prior 10 purchase. The data from these entries is

~e[

forth

in the tables below.

Record ID#:
Date Reported
Case Management Loo
Comments
General Comments
Keywords
Phase 1 Status
Price
Priority I Severity
Produc t Description
Product Received by customer
Product Received by Rosetta
Stone
Product Received by RS from
Customer
Purchased bv customer
~~ased bv Rosetta Stone
Reporters Address

1514
1111012009

Software would not activate, contacted RS cust ser,
advised item was pirated
...
Closed - Archived
$139
3
Spanish LA ver3/ 1·2-3
yes
no

..-

no
yes
no

Report~sCompmyName

Report~s Email Address
Reporters Fa."'< Number
Reporter's Name
Reporter's Phone Number
Reporter's relationship to Pirate
RS Response (email)
Seller Address
Seller Email

docceliot@latLnet
David G. Eliot
(317)413-8646
first time purchaser
--_ ..

http://newezstore.com

-

2
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Seller lD
Seller Name
Seller Phone

DVD Reliable & Professional DVDs Store

URL (where is the producr

Intemet/google

offered?)
Venue
Webpaee
Date Created
Date Modified
Last Modified By

11110/200916:22
11124/2009 10:48
Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp>

Record Owner

Anonvmous <l.ckbs>

Record ID#

1772
1/20/2010

Date Re orted
Case Mana eme... .ll La
Comments
General Comments

....... -

We purchased this in the fall off the internet when we
had googled for rosetta stone spllnish 1,2) & this was
offered at a low price. We began after Christmas here
in OUf homeschool, and after 2 lessons, can move on
no further as we need an activation #, there is no card
whatsoever in the box ...upon calling your service
technicians, they suggested (0 report this. Trus
. product came from China, whic,h we did not realize at
all when we were-ordering ... so the return address,
etc ....are aU in Chinese. What can we,do about this?
This is terribly upsetting and discouraging. Can you
help us wirh this? We can send you the shipping label
or whatever you need.
j
]
Paid AD Pirates (possible)

I

Keywords
Phase I Status

Price
.R1j9rity I Severity
-I;roduct Description

Product Received by customer
Product Received by Rosetta

Researching
$184

3
Rosetta Stone SpilIlish 1.2.3
no
no

Stone
Product Received by RS from

no

Customer
Purchased by customer
Purchased by Rosetta Stone
Reporter's Address
Reporter's Company Name
Rejlorter's Email Address

; yes
no
"WI8111 Prairie Road East
Osseo, WI 54758"
momingstar@triwest.net

3
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LR"JlOrter's Fax Number
I Reporte~_s Name
Reponer's Phone Number
Reporter's relationship to Pirate
RS Response (email)
Seller Address
Seller Email
Seller ID
Seller Name
Seller Phone
(TRL (where is the product
offered?)

(715) 695-3971
I Peggl Becker
(715) 695-3957

-

I

none
Chinele symbo ls

All in Chinese symbol s

IIntemet

--

j
,,

Venue

Webp.ge
Date Created
Date Modified
Last Modified By
Record Owner

Record ID#
Date Reported
Case Management Log

,

\/201201 0 13:08
3110120 108:46

Michael Hill <56768272_ebdp>
Anonvrnous <l .ckbs>

2062

---

1/17/2010

"senr victim a letter for bank.
counterfeit in cabinet

.

Comments
General Comments
Keywords
Phase I Status

Price
Priority I Severity
Product Description
Product Received bv customer
Product Received by Rosetta
Stone
Product Received by RS from

Customer
Purchased by customer
Purchased by Rosetta Stone
Reporter's Address

google paid ad pirates
Closed - Archived
$158
3

Rosetta Sto ne Latin American Spanish (Used)
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
"718 S_ 13th St
fairview, OK 73737

...

_

....

"
Reponer's Company N ame
Reporter's Email Address
Reporter's Fax Number

thamen!al.sbcgo lbaLcom

4
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Reportets Name
Reportets Phone Number
Reporter's relationship to Pirate
RS Response (email)
SeUer Address
SeUer Email
SeUer ID
SeUer Name
SeUer Phone
URL (where is the product
offered?)
Venue
Webpaae
Date Created
Date Modified
Last Modified By
Record Owner

....

I Donita Hamen

..

(580) 227-0893

I

_.
toprosettasrone@)lOtmail.com

www.toprosettastone.com
....

2i17i2010 11:23
21171201011:23
Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp>
Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp>

t,

~

':J

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California and the Commonwealth of
Virginia that the foregoing is [rue and correct and that this Declaration was executed on
April 14, 2010, at Redwood Shores. California.

·Thai Le

5
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